Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 36 | Number 2

Article 8

1-1-2014

Rethinking Online Privacy Litigation as Google
Expands Use of Tracking: Giving Meaning to Our
Online Browsing and the Federal Wiretap Act
Filip Babic

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Filip Babic, Rethinking Online Privacy Litigation as Google Expands Use of Tracking: Giving Meaning to Our Online Browsing and the
Federal Wiretap Act, 36 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 471 (2014).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol36/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Rethinking Online Privacy Litigation as
Google Expands Use of Tracking:
Giving Meaning to Our Online Browsing
and the Federal Wiretap Act
by FILIP BABIC*
I. Introduction .........................................................................................................................
47 1
.... .. ... .
II. What Is the Problem with Online Tracking Anyway? ............
474
III. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act Should Provide Recourse to Consumers to
Protect Against Expansive Use of Online Tracking.............................................................475
A. In re iPhone Application Litigation: The Wiretap Act ..............................

476

B. The Common Law, Communication, and the Need for Expert Witnesses....................479
C. The Interception Requirem ent......................................................................................480
D . Privacy Policies and Term s of Use...............................................................................482
E. Standing and the Injury-in-Fact Requirement...............................................................485
F. Limitations on Litigation and Google's Ubiquity.........................................................486
IV . C onclusion ...........................................................................................................................
487

I. Introduction
While there has been much talk of online privacy, and more broadly
consumer protection, online tracking was not in the position to affect our
offline lives until recently. Tracking in the past was associated with
providing a more tailored online experience, characterized by personalized
ads and faster loading times.' In an attempt to stop online tracking, many
special interest groups have tried to characterize online tracking as an
"injury" to consumers in order to litigate the issue. 2 Since a user is free to
ignore these ads, which may only be of interest to the user based on
*

University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2014.
1.

Talk of the Nation: Data Mining: Does Online Privacy Matter? NATIONAL PUBLIC
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browsing history, courts view online tracking as an "injury" that is de
minimis, 3 and not the "sort of violation which typically is compensable." 4
However, as Google begins using a user's browsing history in more
expansive ways-particularly making judgments about the user based on
her search-it should become increasingly apparent that pervasive data
mining is an "injury" to consumers which needs to be curtailed.
As of March 1, 2012, Google implemented new privacy policies that
altered the "use of personal information obtained from users."5 Instead of
keeping personal information "about a user of a given Google service
separate from information gathered from other Google services," 6 the new
policies "consolidate[d] user data from across its services and create[d] a
single merged profile for each user." 7 This policy has the effect of creating
a distinct and complex online profile for each user, from which Google
makes significant inferences about the user's character.8 While many
theorists generally have had trouble finding legal remedies to pervasive
online tracking,9 Google has made it easier to fit data mining into existing
privacy laws as these practices are becoming increasingly invasive.
This note will argue that these practices violate the Wiretap Act (the
"Act") as amended by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
("ECPA").'o The Wiretap Act provides a cause of action against anyone
who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication."" The Act, originally drafted to prevent eavesdropping
on telephone conversations, 2 requires interception of the contents of
communication and not merely the circumstances surrounding the
communication.13 As Google's practices have made it easier for users to
characterize their searches as the "contents of communication," the Wiretap
3.

Id.

4. Id.
5. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FTC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation
omitted).
6. Id
7. Id.
8. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 1.
9. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, "Do-Not-Track" as Contract, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
545 (2012) [hereinafter Fairfield, Do-Not-Track].
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012).
11. In re Phone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)).
12. See Shana K. Rahavy, The Federal Wiretap Act: The Permissible Scope of
Eavesdropping in the Family Home, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 87, 88 (2003); see also Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 539 (1985).
13. iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
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Act has become a plausible cause of action for consumers who are
"injured" by Google's appropriation of their personal information. The
irony is apparent: The new ways in which Google uses an individual's
search history has made it easier to apply online tracking to existing
privacy statutes, statutes whose drafters could not have foreseen the
existence of such technology. 14
While this note does not argue that the Wiretap Act is an ideal cause of
action and makes no attempt at gauging the probability of its success, it
attempts to show that the Act can provide a potential cause of action in a
changing internet landscape. This note will use the following fact pattern,
based on actual Google practices, as a basis for discussing the
expansiveness of online tracking: A user types "guitar" into the search field
and hits enter; the user then applies for a credit card from the same
computer; the user receives a lower credit limit on the credit card for which
she applied as a result of her previous search for "guitar." 5 The reasoning
behind the change in credit limit in response to the search for "guitar" is
based on an empirical study, which showed that guitarists and musicians
are less likely to pay back their debts and/or pay them on time than other
segments of the population.16 Hence, Google makes an inference about a
user from their search in a way that exceeds the user's expectations of the
effects of her search.17 While she may be getting a banner ad for Guitar
Center on the next website she visits, she is also unknowingly getting a
lower credit limit and higher interest rate on her next credit card offer.'8
Part II of this note will begin by presenting people's perceptions and
views on both the practice and effects of online tracking. Part III will argue
that the ECPA can provide a plausible remedy to the problem of online
tracking. Finally in Part IV, the limitations and potential pitfalls of
litigating against Google will be discussed.

14. For an extensive argument that the common law should be expanded to govern behavior
in the virtual world, see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds
Govern Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55 (2012) [hereinafter Fairfield, Mixed Reality].
15. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.
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II. What Is the Problem with Online Tracking Anyway?
A recent survey, conducted by researchers at the Berkeley Center for
Law and Technology, found that a majority of Americans do not want their
The survey
personal information collected surreptitiously online.' 9
indicates that a majority of internet users are not aware of how pervasive
and expansive online tracking has become, with the majority believing that
online tracking is limited to "purposes of serving tailored
advertisements," 20 and with one in five telling researchers that "they
believed advertisers were not allowed to track people when they browsed
medical sites." 21 While this note is limited to discussing Google's practice
of creating an online profile of each user, surveys have shown that people
have similar misconceptions regarding the use their private data by social
networks like Facebook and Myspace.22
Tailoring advertisements to a particular user is possible by employing
the technique of online behavioral advertising ("OBA"), which creates a
23
This
profile for a specific user based on his or her online activities.
advertising profile is extremely profitable to companies like Google, as
recent studies suggest that Google makes as much as seven hundred dollars
per user per year.24 The use of data mining, not limited to marketing
purposes, has gone largely unnoticed by consumers mainly because of the

19. Somini Sengupta, Study Finds Broad Wariness Over Online Tracking,N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/most-americans-are-wary-of-being-trackedonline-study-says.html?_r=0 states that:
Sixty percent [of participants] said they prefer regulation to 'prevent Web sites
from collecting information' about them; [twenty] percent said such a tool
should allow them to block Web sites from serving up ads; and [fourteen]
percent said they would like it to 'prevent Web sites from tailoring
advertisements' based on sites they had visited.
Id.
20. Id.
2 1. Id.
22. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information
Sharing,and Privacy on the Facebook,Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies 36 (2006), available at http://heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-grossfacebook-privacy-PET-fmal.pdf.
23. BLASE UR, PEDRO G. LEON, LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, RICHARD SHAY & YANG WANG,
SMART, USEFUL, SCARY, CREEPY: PERCEPTIONS OF ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTING (Privacy

Enhancing Technologies Workshop 2006), available at https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/te
ch_ reports/CMUCyLabl2007.pdf [hereinafter BLASE].
24. Joe Mullin, How Much Do Google and Facebook Profit from Your Data?, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/10/how-much-do-google-andfacebook-profit-from-your-datal.
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opt-out approach to privacy in the United States. 25 Furthermore, recent
legal scholarship suggests that the U.S. legal system is ill-equipped to deal
with the privacy issues arising from data mining practices and online
behavioral surveillance.2 6 With the dramatic and rapid pace of evolving
technology, 27 the law appears lethargic in the face of change, leaving
special interest groups and legal scholars scrambling for a legal remedy
capable of addressing such an unparalleled issue.28

III. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act Should Provide
Recourse to Consumers to Protect Against Expansive Use of
Online Tracking.
This note argues that ECPA,29 may be able to provide a remedy to
consumers frustrated with the way in which Google uses their private
information. While historically the Act has not been successful in
curtailing pervasive online tracking, 30 as Google expands the way in which
it uses browsing data beyond marketing, it should become increasingly
plausible to argue that Google's online tracking practices violate the Act.
The Act provides a private cause of action against any person, or
company who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept ... any wire,
oral, or electronic communication," 3 ' or who "intentionally uses, or
endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication." 3 2 Up to this point, litigants have had trouble fitting data
privacy violation claims into existing federal statutes because the Act
requires that the actual "contents of a communication" be intercepted.
The Act limits "contents" to "information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication," 34 and information pertaining
to the identity of the author, like "names, addresses, and phone numbers of
25.

Eric Johnson, Steven Bellman & Gerald Lohse, Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why

Opting In-Opting Out, 13 Marketing Letters 5-15 (2002), available at https://www8.gsb.colum
bia.edu/sites/decisionsciences/files/files/defaultsframing-and.privacy.pdf.
26. See Ballon & Mantell, supra note 2.
27. There seems to be an Orwellian fear that our online activities, or even our Facebook
profiles, will one day be used by potential employers to judge our moral character.
28.

See generally Fairfield,Mixed Reality, supra note 14.

29. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (2012).
30. See Ballon & Mantell, supra note 2.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(d).
33.

See Ballon & Mantell, supra note 2.

34. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §2510(8) (2012)).
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parties,"3 does not fit this definition.36 Accordingly, Google does not
violate the Act when it collects data concerning only users' identities and
activities, as this information is used primarily to determine the interests of
a particular user for marketing purposes.
This note argues that the manner and means in which Google has begun
to use the consumer's online activity violates the Wiretap Act due to the fact
that Google's tracking methodology gives "meaning" to simple searches.
Within this note, "meaning" is defined as "what the source or sender
expresses, communicates, or conveys in their message to the observer or
receiver, and what the receiver infers from the current context." 3 9 Thus,
according to linguistics, there are two points at which a communication is
given meaning:40 At the sending stage (the user typing in 'guitar'), and at the
receiving stage (the search is used by Google to make assumptions about the
user).4 1 While a user may not have intended to convey such meaning to
Google, or to a third party, Google is nevertheless creating meaning at the
receiving stage, often unbeknownst to the consumer.42 It should be noted
that the discrepancy between what a sender intends to communicate and what
meaning the receiver assigns to the communication is not by any means
novel; in fact, it is pervasive through all forms and mediums of expression
and communication.43 Thus, these simple searches can and should be
characterized as "contents of the communication" for purposes of the Act.
A. In re iPhone Application Litigation: The Wiretap Act
In re iPhone Application Litigation4 4 demonstrates why the Wiretap

Act has not provided a remedy in the past while simultaneously opening
the door to future litigation involving data privacy. In iPhone, Plaintiffs
claimed that Defendants "violated their privacy rights by unlawfully
allowing third party applications ("apps") that run on the iDevices to

35. Id. (citing Hill v. MCI WorldComm Commc'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1195-96 (S.D.
Iowa 2000)).
36. Id. (citing Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1008 (E.D.
Mich. 1998)).

37. Id.
38. See Talk ofthe Nation, supra note 1.
39. Nick Sanchez, Communication Process, NEW JERSEY INST. OF TECH., http://web.njitedu
/-ipuma/352comproc/ comproc.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
40. For an in-depth discussion on linguistic "meaning" see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE
AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987).
4 1. Id.

42. See Talk ofthe Nation, supra note 1.
43. Id. (Think language, art, etc.).
44. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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collect and make use of, for commercial purposes, personal information
without user consent or knowledge,"45 even though the consumers
consented to privacy agreements when they bought their iDevices and
downloaded apps. 46 The apps collected Plaintiffs' "addresses and current
whereabouts; the unique device identifier ("UDID") assigned to the iDevice;
the user's gender, age, zip code and time zone; and app-specific information
such as which functions Plaintiff performed on the app."4'7 Although the
court found that such information was not considered actual "contents of
communication" for purposes of the Wiretap Act,48 the case demonstrates
the court's willingness to consider broadening the federal statute in order to
include modem technologies not previously captured by the Act.49
Plaintiffs in iPhone asserted multiple causes of action, but the court's
analysis of the Wiretap Act indicates that it remains a viable cause of action
for users who can characterize their Google searches as actual "contents of
communication. "
The court explained that "content is limited to
information the user intended to communicate, such as the words spoken in
a phone call," 5 ' and does not include geolocation data that is generated
automatically without user intent.52 The court emphasized that Plaintiffs
failed to state a cause of action under the federal Wiretap Act because they
alleged only interception of "automatically generated geolocation data."5 3
Such data contains only information concerning the identity of the parties
and the fact that the communication took place. 54 However, interception of
the "substance, purport, or meaning of that communication" would fall
under the Act.55 While the iPhone holding has been the norm in online
data privacy cases, as companies like Google begin to assign "substance,
purport, and meaning" 56 to the information they receive from users, it
should become easier to conceptualize the idea that the data intercepted by
companies are actual "contents of communication."

45. Id. at 1049.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1050.
48. Id. at 1061-62.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

That is this note's reading of the case at least.
iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id.
iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
See Ballon & Mantell, supra note 2.
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Applying the Wiretap Act to the facts introduced in Part I would likely
lead to a different result because it is both easier to show the intent
requirement on the part of the user and to characterize a user's searches as
actual "content of communication" within iPhone's broad definition.
When a Google user enters the word "guitar" into the search field, the user
is telling Google that he or she is interested in a guitar. If the user clicks on
a store's link, the user is telling Google that he or she is interested in
purchasing a guitar, and consequently interested in actually playing the
guitar. The user effectively tells Google, "I'm interested in the guitar, what
do you know about it?" If any doubt exists as to whether the user had
intended to convey this message, the doubt is eliminated after the user
clicks the first link in the search results. Thus, potential plaintiffs can
satisfy the intent requirement, as these searches are not "automatically
generated geolocation data" 8 created by our personal property, but are
meaningful words purposefully entered into the search bar.
Although users may know that online tracking is designed to determine a
user's interest, Google takes the process one step further by making
assumptions about a user's offline habits based on the search terms entered
into the search field.5 9 Even though users are becoming accustomed to tailored
advertisements, they are not accustomed to having their credit card offers
impacted.o Users assume that Google operates more like a machine than a
person, blindly generating answers in response to requests; this view may be
perpetuated as much by Google, as by users' expectations of what an online
search engine does. 61
However, much like an individual party to a
conversation, Google brings its own perceptions, ideas, and experiences to the
"conversation." It makes assumptions and inferences, as well as categorizes
people based on what they are "saying." Ultimately, the "conversation" is
given meaning based on inferences drawn from the collective experiences, in
62
this case empirical studies and statistics, of the receiving party.62 Even though
most users may not view their Google searches as "contents of
communication," Google finds them both meaningful and valuable.63 As a
result, this note suggests that, as many similar legal concepts develop and
evolve over time, the courts should look at the way the parties treat the

58. Id.

59. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 1. (As discussed above, many users are not aware of
the fact that they are being tracked, nor are they aware of how their information is being used.).
60. Id.

61. See supra Part II (the extent to which Google is misleading users regarding the breadth
and implementation of the personal data they collect is beyond the scope of this paper).
62.
63.

See Talk of the Nation, supra note 1.
Id.
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communication in order to ascertain whether or not it is meaningful to either
party. In this case, Google searches should be considered the "contents of
communication," even if a user intends to convey information about him or
herself that is far different than what Google receives.
B. The Common Law, Communication, and the Need for Expert Witnesses

While the court in iPhone notes that content is limited to things a user
actually "intended to communicate,"4 how a person communicates is
hardly limited to words alone.6 5 The discussion of libel in Weller v.
American Broadcasting Co., Inc. 66 is indicative of California courts'
willingness to expand common law definitions of "communication" in
accord with developments in linguistics and cognitive science. In Weller,
the California court recognized that "linguists are able to identify and
explain how certain rhetorical devices or patterns of speech convey implicit
meaning."6 7 While section 45 of the California Civil Code6 8 defines libel
as "words" and "language," 6 9 the court recognized that the meaning of the
words should not be analyzed in a vacuum. 70
According to Weller, "the context, juxtaposition of certain pieces of
information, the choice of words, and the tone and inflection of the
speakers, were likely to affect the viewer's understanding of what was
being said expressly and implicitly."71 Effectively, implicit and explicit
meaning is conveyed at the sending end, and then interpreted by the listener
at the receiving end. While the inclusion of testimony by a professor of
linguistics in a libel suit may be viewed as progressive, section 801 of the
California Evidence Code "does not require that the jury be wholly
ignorant of the subject matter of the expert opinion in order to justify its
admission." 72 Despite the fact that a typical juror listens and interprets
what people say on a daily basis, the court allowed jurors to hear expert
testimony regarding how they interpret language, and glean meaning from
the circumstances surrounding the statement.

64.

In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

65. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 1.
66.

Weller v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 232 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1001 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).

67. Id. at 1008.
68.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (2012).

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Weller, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1008.
Id.
Id. at 1007 (citation omitted) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE
Id. at 1007-08.

§ 801 (1967)).
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While Google searches are undoubtedly a type of communication, the
question remains whether or not these searches represent the "substance,
purport, or meaning," of the communication in the eyes of the law. Even
though the facts in Weller are much different than the fact pattern used for
this note, the case is indicative of the California courts' willingness to hear
expert testimony regarding how language is interpreted. While the libel
statute may limit the tort to "words" "or language," 74 the court recognized
the need to broaden the statute in order to bring it closer in line with the
reality of how people understand and give meaning to words and
language. In our case, a litigant would fare better with an expert telling
the court how OBA works and what techniques are used to interpret a
user's search. By giving the court a closer look into this process, the court
may see that the process is analogous to how people find implicit meaning
throughout all forms of communication, allowing for a higher probability
of characterizing Google searches as the actual "contents of the
communication."
C. The Interception Requirement
The Wiretap Act prohibits the "interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications."76
While the "interception" requirement may be
problematic under the fact pattern provided by this note, iPhone at least
demonstrates that the courts may be willing to interpret "interception"
broadly. For our Google recipient, iPhone suggests that a court would be
hesistant to dismiss a claim based on this requirement. The exception to the
Act provides that it is not "unlawful ... for a person not acting under the
color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to such interception." 7 7 Under
the Wiretap Act, "intercept" is defined as "the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 7 8 Even though the statute
can be read broadly, courts have expressed concern about "the judicial
interpretation of a statute written prior to the widespread usage of the internet
and the World Wide Web in a case involving purported interceptions of
online communications." 79 In order to narrow the application of the statute,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(a) (2012).
In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)).
In re Pharmatrak Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (4) (2012)).
Id.

2014]

RETHINKING ONLINE PRIVACY LITIGATION

481

courts have adopted a real-time requirement which requires the interception
to be simultaneous with the transmission,8 0 a distinction that appears
arbitrary
and
pointless.
Thus,
communication
intercepted
contemporaneously from transmissions could violate the Wiretap Act, while
communication intercepted from storage, or from a hard drive, would only
implicate the Stored Communications Act ("SCA").8 '
The First Circuit observed that this dichotomy cannot successfully
"address current problems" regarding internet privacy. 82 The court states
that "technology has, to some extent, overtaken language. Traveling the
internet, electronic communications are often-perhaps constantly-both
'in transit' and 'in storage' simultaneously a linguistic but not a
technological paradox."8 3 In iPhone, Apple argued that since its operating
system was designed to "access and transmit location data from the mobile
device to Apple's servers," it must have been "the intended recipient of the
location data from users' mobile devices," 84 and therefore could not have
intercepted the data.85 The court was reluctant to accept this argument,
finding that the intended communication was "between the users' iPhone
and the Wi-Fi and cell phone towers, and Plaintiffs appeared to allege that
Apple designed its operating system to intercept that communication and
transmit the information to Apple's servers." 86 The court held that "Apple
cannot manufacture a statutory exception through its own accused
conduct,"8 7 and that, as a result, the statutory exception does not apply.88
Even though the users were on Apple iPhones, the court found that the
users' information was being intercepted by Apple at the point where it
reached the Wi-Fi and cell phone towers. 89
The willingness by the court to accept this type of argument, which
employs the technical aspects of the transmission, could allow Google
users to formulate their own argument as to how and at what point in the

transmission their data is being intercepted. 90 While a user may have

80. Id. at 22.
81. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12.
82. Pharmatrak,329 F.3d at 21, 22.
83. Id. (citing United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. This note makes no attempt at discovering the intricacies of the Online Behavioral
Advertising ("OBA") technique, nor how this data is later shared with third parties.
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intended to share his searches with Google servers, operating as the Wi-Fi
or cell phone tower in this case, the user likely did not intend to share their
communication with anyone or anything but the server, such as those
portions of Google responsible for implementing OBA. 91 The user
definitely did not intend to share this information with third parties like
credit card companies or advertisers.9 2 Again, this note is arguing that after
iPhone, courts are becoming more receptive to arguments that utilize the
functional aspects of technology-the way in which communication is
received and transmitted-as the basis for satisfying the interception
requirement. As long as a potential plaintiff can pinpoint the location at
which his intended communication is being appropriated, by either a party
or a particular technological process not representing the intended receiver
of such communication, such arguments become plausible.
D. Privacy Policies and Terms of Use
While the main focus of this note is the application of the Wiretap Act
to current data privacy litigation, an analysis of such application would be
incomplete without a discussion of the effects of both privacy policies and
terms of use on such claims. Even though the use of data mining is
disclaimed in websites' privacy policies and terms of use, few consumers
actually read these policies, 9 3 which have the effect of binding the
consumer to the terms set forth in those agreements.9 4 Privacy policies and
terms of service ("TOS" also known as Terms of Use, or "TOU") may be
deemed adhesion contracts, effectively telling consumers not to use the
website if they do not like the terms.9 5 As Professor Joshua Fairfield points
out in his article "Do-Not-Track" as Contract,96 consumers have no ability,
aside from abstaining from using certain websites or the Internet altogether,
to stop the use of online tracking. 97 "[C]ourts only look at corporatedrafted terms even when they are attempting to protect consumer interests,
consumer victories are one-shot, flash-in-the-pan victories that merely

91. A discussion of the effects of Google's Privacy Policies and Terms of Use will be
discussed in more detail below. Infra Part 1IID.
92.

See Talk ofthe Nation, supranote 1.

93. The author has not read these policies, which seems to be the norm among legal
scholars. See Fairfield, Do Not Track, supranote 9, at 551.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Talk of the nation, supra note 1.
See Fairfield,Do Not Track, supra note 9, at 545.
Id.
Id.
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cause the corporation to rewrite its End User License Agreement
("EULA") or TOS to avoid the prior result in future cases." 9 8
Despite Professor Fairfield's jaded view on privacy policies, recent
case law suggests that perhaps these adhesion contracts are not fatal to data
mining litigation." iPhone suggests that courts are increasingly willing to
take a discerning look at these contracts, and interpret ambiguities in favor
of the plaintiff. 00 In iPhone, Apple claimed that the Plaintiffs' claims were
foreclosed by the privacy policies and the terms and conditions of the
iTunes Apps Store (the "Agreement"),' 0 which "explicitly permitted" and
disclaimed all liability "arising from third party conduct."' 0 2 The court did
not take this claim for granted and proceeded to take a discerning look at
the policy, stating that "[i]f a contract is capable of two different reasonable
interpretations, the contract is ambiguous." 0 3 The court went on to state
that "[i]n cases of uncertainty not removed by the preceding rules, the
language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party
who caused the uncertainty to exist." 04
To be clear, this note is not trying to assert that such ambiguity actually
exists in the Google privacy policy,' only that this court was willing to
take a discerning look at these policies in order to make sure they are valid
in disclaiming all warranties. The court declined to rule on the validity of
the Plaintiffs' claims at summary judgment, as "[p]laintiffs have a
colorable argument that the terms of the privacy agreement were
ambiguous and do not necessarily foreclose the remaining claims against
Apple."' 06 Interestingly, the ambiguity stemmed from what the court saw
as competing definitions of "personal information" in the privacy policy.
One clause stated that Apple "may collect non-personal information
including zip code, area code, unique device identifier, [and] location," 0 7
and can "collect, use, transfer, and disclose non-personal information for
any purpose" 0 8 while Apple defined personal information in a separate
98. Id. at 580.
99. Similar to the intercept requirement discussed above, the court in iPhone appears
hesitant to dismiss the claim based on the terms of use.
100. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fid. Fed. Bank, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1448 (1997)).
104. iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
105. Due to the length of the typical privacy policy, one could presume that ambiguity does
indeed exist.
106. iPhone,844 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
107. Id. at 1077.
108. Id.
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section as "data that can be used to uniquely identify or contact a single

person."' 09 Such personal data cannot be as freely disclosed, used, collected,
or transferred under the Agreement,"o leaving both the consumer and court
uncertain as to which provision applies to a user's geolocation data.
The court's finding of ambiguity in Apple's privacy policy illustrates
the fact that such policies should not be perceived by potential claimants as
absolute bars to any potential claims they may have. Despite the Plaintiffs'
"colorable" argument concerning the user agreements, the court was
reluctant to find for Apple, indicating that such claims have the potential to
overcome any barriers established in the privacy policy."
While a thorough discussion exceeds the scope of this note, it is worth
mentioning that one problem that has been incipient upon Google's privacy
policy is the online tracking of minors under the age of thirteen, who are
legally not allowed to enter into contracts disclaiming their privacy
rights.112 At least among minors, Google cannot obtain permission to
track."'
As online tracking and data mining practices evolve over time, views
on potential privacy violations should also change. Both the courts and
potential litigants should not limit themselves to Professor Fairfield's
bifurcated view, which leaves consumers deciding between completely
abstaining from using Google services, or accepting that their online
activity will be subject to monitoring.1 4 In Branding Privacy, a recent
article recognizing the inadequacy of the opt-in/opt-out regime, Professor
Paul Ohm sets forth a novel proposal that utilizes the signaling qualities of
trademarks in order to "meet the notice deficiencies of privacy law."" 5 He
argues that any company dealing with customer information should be
forced to "bind its brand name to a fully specified set of core privacy
commitments.""' 6 This notion of "branding policy" is an example of an
innovative solution to evolving privacy concerns which should not be
dismissed merely because a website contains a link to an adhesion contract
entitled "Privacy Policy." In balancing privacy concerns with theories of

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Education Innovation and the Law: Generation
C: Childhood, Code and Creativity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1979 (2012) (citing the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2006)).
113. Id.
114. See Talk ofthe Nation, supra note 1.
115. Paul Ohm, BrandingPrivacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907,911 (2013).
116. Id. at 911-12.
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free enterprise, the opt-in/opt-out system fails to properly apprise users of
how their online activity is being utilized, and has thus proven to be
defective.
E. Standing and the Injury-in-Fact Requirement

In order to satisfy the "case and controversy" requirement of Article
III of the U.S. Constitution the plaintiff needs to allege: "(1) [I]njury-in-fact
that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual and imminent; (2)
wherein injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely (not merely speculative) that injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision."' 17 In iPhone, Plaintiffs' alleged "actual injury,"
which included "diminished and consumed iDevice resources, such as
storage, battery life, and bandwidth."" 8 Among the personal information
collected by the iPhone apps were the Plaintiffs' "home and workplace
locations, gender, age, zip code, terms search, Plaintiffs app ID and
password for specific app accounts, etc., through each of the downloaded
apps."" 9
While the court was reluctant to find standing based on these
"injuries," the court found that "[t]he injury required by Article III may
exist by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing."l 20 This last statement is oddly circular because standing
is a "threshold" question where an actual injury is required.12 1 The logic of
the statement is as follows: (1) Plaintiffs allege a violation of the Wiretap
Act; (2) the Wiretap Act provides that "any person whose electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation
of the Act may in a civil action recover from the entity which engaged in
that violation;" 22 (3) if the court finds that plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case under the Wiretap Act then the "alleged facts are sufficient
to establish that they have suffered the injury required for standing under
Article III.",123 Effectively, if plaintiffs can allege sufficient facts that the
Wiretap Act was violated, plaintiffs can claim a concrete injury for the

117. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2012)).
118. Id. at 1054.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1055 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quoatation
marks omitted).
121. Id. at 1053.
122. Id. at 1055 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510)(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (citing Gaos v. Google, Inc., 2012 WL 1094646, at *3
(N.D. Cal. 2012)).
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purposes of Article III standing.124 Interestingly, many of the injuries
alleged by the Plaintiffs in iPhone are not only injuries to their own sense
of privacy, but injuries to their property-their iPhones-and their
bandwidth. While discussion of effects on the use of cookies on computers
is outside the scope of this note, after iPhone, pleading such injury will
prove to be futile. Even though establishing a violation of the Wiretap Act
will satisfy the injury requirements, there is no doubt that defendants will
continue their attempts to dismiss these allegations before trial. Thus, in
order to gain traction the fact pattern provided by this note 2 5 may be
sufficient to show injury-in-fact, as the example provides an opportunity
for litigants to conceptualize, and categorize such effects of online tracking
as a distinct and palpable injury. 12 6 Hopefully, the courts' view of
"injuries" to users stemming from online tracking as de minimis27 Will
begin to change as users' begin to experience real effects from their online
behavior.
F. Limitations on Litigation and Google's Ubiquity
One of the biggest problems for Google's users is that some consumers
do not have a choice to opt-out, or to stop using Google altogether, since
many employers require their employees to create a Gmail account as their
primary work-email account. 12 8 Additionally, some users view online
tracking and data mining as the cost of doing business.12 9 Google provides
a great service, but one that is not really "free."' 30 Some argue that Google
should be viewed as an exchange, where Google is able to "take user data,
sell it to advertisers, and make money that allows them to give themselves
a paycheck while keeping you afloat in free digital services."' 3 ' While this
may be true, the problem is that many users are not aware of the breadth
and scope of the exchange and feel that their costs are limited to the banner
ads they receive on subsequent websites for products they previously
searched.13 2 As the scope of online tracking broadens, it is important for
the law to recognize and curtail these practices before their limitations
124. Id.
125. While this note bases its argument on the "guitar search/credit limit decrease" discussed
in length above, there is no doubt that there are other such instances of online tracking that result
in the negative impact on a users' offline life.
126. The effects being a lower credit limit.
127. See Ballong & Mantell, supra note 2.
128. See Talk ofthe Nation, supranote 1.
129. See BLASE, supra note 23.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Sengupta, supra note 19.
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become indiscernible and affect our offline lives in more distinct and
tangible ways.
Another consideration is that Google is a powerful business tool, and
many companies rely on Google to help them generate business and attract
customers. Recently, French authorities attempted to have Google comply
with their privacy policies; along with most European countries, France's
system is an opt-in system requiring the consent of the user before the
website can track and data mine the user's computer. 13 3 In response,
Google threatened to exclude all French links from search results, which
resulted in the French authorities backing down.134 They recognized that if
Google removed its links from the search results, it would have an adverse
effect on businesses. Such actions demonstrate Google's power to protect
its business model.
The tides in the United States may change, as the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") has taken action against Google in regards to the way
that they have handled their users' personal data.135 Even though these
actions resulted in a settlement of a "record breaking $22.5 million civil
penalty," Google is not changing the way it handles personal data, as the
profits resulting from private data collection likely outweigh the costs of
litigation.13 6
Despite the failure to curtail Google's personal data
collection, the FTC has sent a message to the rest of the world, namely that
the United States cares about internet privacy and personal data.

IV. Conclusion
The Wiretap Act may become an increasingly plausible cause of action
against the collection of personal data by search engines. As collected
information is characterized and given meaning, internet searches should
be considered as the actual content of the communication, even under the
current reading of the statute. As Google implements users' information,
sells it to third parties, and begins to affect the offline lives of its users, it
will be more and more difficult for it to protect itself solely by disclaimer,
articulated in its terms of use and privacy policy. As technology grows,
interpretations of old statutes must expand to accommodate our privacy
interests.

133.

Michiel Willems, Google Threatens to Exclude French Links from Search Results, SNL

KAGAN
134.
135.
13 6.

MEDIA & COMMC'N REPORT (2012).
Id.
Francoise Gilbert, FTC v. Google: Lessons Learned, INTERNET LAW & STRATEGY (2012).
Id.
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